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AbstrAct
Background Healthcare organisations often fail to 
harvest and make use of the ‘soft intelligence’ about 
safety and quality concerns held by their own personnel. 
We aimed to examine the role of formal channels in 
encouraging or inhibiting employee voice about concerns.
Methods Qualitative study involving personnel from 
three academic hospitals in two countries. Interviews 
were conducted with 165 participants from a wide range 
of occupational and professional backgrounds, including 
senior leaders and those from the sharp end of care. Data 
analysis was based on the constant comparative method.
Results Leaders reported that they valued employee voice; 
they identified formal organisational channels as a key 
route for the expression of concerns by employees. Formal 
channels and processes were designed to ensure fairness, 
account for all available evidence and achieve appropriate 
resolution. When processed through these formal systems, 
concerns were destined to become evidenced, formal and 
tractable to organisational intervention. But the way these 
systems operated meant that some concerns were never 
voiced. Participants were anxious about having to process 
their suspicions and concerns into hard evidentiary facts, and 
they feared being drawn into official procedures designed to 
allocate consequence. Anxiety about evidence and process 
was particularly relevant when the intelligence was especially 
‘soft’—feelings or intuitions that were difficult to resolve 
into a coherent, compelling reconstruction of an incident or 
concern. Efforts to make soft intelligence hard thus risked 
creating ‘forbidden knowledge’: dangerous to know or share.
Conclusions The legal and bureaucratic considerations 
that govern formal channels for the voicing of concerns 
may, perversely, inhibit staff from speaking up. Leaders 
responsible for quality and safety should consider 
complementing formal mechanisms with alternative, 
informal opportunities for listening to concerns.
IntroductIon
Healthcare systems have long grappled with 
the challenges of identifying, addressing 
and preventing problems of poor quality 
and safety.1 Information known to those 
working at the sharp end of care is increas-
ingly recognised as an important resource 
in anticipating and preventing harm, but 
is often neglected.2 3 Sometimes this is 
because a tendency towards ‘comfort-
seeking’ rather than ‘problem-sensing’ 
behaviours among leaders4 may result in 
personnel remaining silent or organisations 
failing to hear.5 Less well understood is why 
organisations fail to uncover concerns even 
when they are, in principle at least, eager to 
do so. Important challenges remain poorly 
understood in accessing ‘soft intelligence’: 
the kind of information known at the sharp 
end of care that characteristically escapes 
capture but may offer a valuable guide to 
potential problems.2 
As in other industries, comprehensive 
insight into threats to safety will likely 
depend on employees at the sharp end 
giving voice to safety concerns.6 7 In the 
healthcare context, much research and 
policy attention has focused on the devel-
opment of systems to enable access to 
safety relevant information.8 9 They include 
monitoring and surveillance of quality indi-
cators,10 incident reporting systems and 
risk management techniques adopted from 
other industries.11 Policy interventions 
have sought to provide legal safeguards for 
whistle-blowing12 and encourage openness 
and transparency.13 14 These approaches 
have important strengths, but by them-
selves may not provide a complete picture; 
on occasion they may mislead.8 15
One reason why formal systems fail 
to surface the breadth of concerns is 
that speaking up is heavily influenced 
by cultural, psychological and social 
factors.16 For instance, incident reporting 
may be resisted by professional groups 
who resent managerial control and 
erosion of professional independence.9 
Individuals in interdependent groups may 
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be troubled about potential damage to relationships 
arising from challenging the status quo or calling into 
question others’ behaviour.17 Recent work has also 
identified the importance of implicit theories about 
the negative consequences of giving voice,18 and has 
deepened understanding of the influence of the type 
of concern (eg, safety vs professionalism) on speaking 
up.19 20
In this article, we describe a further possible influ-
ence on speaking up: how certain properties of formal 
channels for speaking up—including information tech-
nology-based mechanisms such as incident reporting 
systems, and also formal policies and protocols for 
raising concerns through the managerial hierarchy—
may, perversely, act as deterrents to voice.
Methods
We conducted a qualitative study involving semistruc-
tured interviews in three healthcare organisations. The 
selection of sites was initially pragmatic: one organisa-
tion, having experienced a serious problem involving 
patient harm, commissioned a study to understand how 
to improve voice by examining practices of speaking 
and listening within its hospitals. Following initial data 
collection and analysis, two other sites were chosen 
purposefully to extend the analysis and to test the trans-
ferability of constructs to other contexts: one organi-
sation, in the same country as the first and with some 
similar characteristics (a prestigious teaching hospital), 
had undertaken a programme of cultural enhancement 
that included a focus on practices of voice; the other was 
in a different high-income country. All three were rela-
tively large organisations based across several sites, and 
all three were academic medical centres with affiliations 
with nearby university medical schools.
In each site, heads of purposively selected depart-
ments were asked to distribute an email asking 
colleagues to participate in a confidential interview. 
With a view to ensuring that the views of a range of 
occupational groups were included in the study, we 
sought to include leaders and managers at the blunt 
end of care, and individuals at the sharp end (eg, physi-
cians, nurses, technical/administrative staff, build-
ings and housekeeping staff). The email included an 
information brochure explaining the study, stressing 
its confidential nature and guaranteeing that no one 
at the hospital would be told who had participated. 
The email included a link to a confidential response 
website. Interested individuals provided contact details 
on this website, were contacted by an interviewer and 
given further information. Arrangements were made 
to conduct a telephone interview with those still inter-
ested in participating.
Semistructured interviews were conducted using 
a topic guide that included questions about how 
personnel raised concerns about situations or prac-
tices that they felt might not support patient safety. 
All interviews were digitally audio-recorded. At site 
1, interviews were conducted by GM and a freelance 
interviewer; interviews at other sites were conducted 
by ELA. Care was taken to ensure independence of the 
data collection and analysis process. Data collection 
and transcript coding were undertaken by researchers 
with no connection to the case study organisations; 
interview transcripts were not shared with any staff 
in the organisations. Although the initial study was 
commissioned by the first hospital, freedom to publish 
findings was agreed from the start.
This study was submitted for ethical review at each 
participating organisation. At two sites it received 
approval. At one site it was deemed quality improve-
ment and exempted from approval; the study team 
nonetheless used a consent procedure at all sites. 
Interview recordings were transcribed verbatim, and 
transcripts were anonymised. Following transcription, 
recordings were deleted. No link was retained between 
transcripts and participants. Transcripts were not 
shared with any personnel at participating hospitals.
Data analysis was based on the constant comparative 
method.21 A selection of interviews was open coded 
to develop an initial coding frame which was applied 
to subsequent transcripts, and iteratively refined as 
new codes were defined. NVivo software was used to 
manage the process.
In presenting our findings, we occasionally alter 
minor details of quotations to preserve anonymity.
results
We received 329 initial responses to the invitation for 
interview and conducted 165 interviews (table 1). We 
did not sample among those who responded, instead 
interviewing everyone who both responded and was 
able to make arrangements for an interview. Across 
participants, there was acknowledgement of the 
importance of concern raising as a means of ensuring 
vigilance about quality and safety, but while more 
senior participants often drew attention to the role of 
formal channels, it was clear that those at the sharp 
end had many anxieties about these mechanisms. We 
explore these views, and their consequences for the 
effectiveness of the organisations’ efforts to promote 
voice, in the five sections that follow.
Table 1 Responses to invitation and interviews conducted 
across the three sites
Responses 
to invitation
Interviews 
conducted
Interviews 
with leaders 
and senior 
managers: 
the ‘blunt 
end’
Interviews 
with 
frontline 
personnel: 
the ‘sharp 
end’
Site 1 118 67 20 47
Site 2 78 47 16 31
Site 3 133 51 21 30
Total 329 165 57 108
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Valuing voice
In interviews, leaders and senior managers across the 
sites emphasised the need for concerns about safety 
and quality to be raised by personnel throughout the 
organisation, at every level. Many stressed that they 
welcomed information about anything with potential 
consequence for safety, whether technical, systemic or 
behavioural, and regardless of apparent gravity. In no 
site was there a shortage of mechanisms for people to 
report incidents or raise concerns, from online inci-
dent reporting systems to staff surveys and morbidity 
and mortality conferences, as well as encouragement 
to confide in senior personnel.
I just tell every employee during orientation that they 
can always feel comfortable coming to me if they have 
concerns that they want to share. (Executive, Site 1)
I’m pretty liberal about safety reports. I encourage 
them to do them no matter what, even if it seems 
minor. (Director, Site 3)
Across the sites, however, participants reported a 
pervasive sense that much potentially relevant intel-
ligence did not reach managerial level and was not 
detectable through these formally instituted systems.
I do believe that we have a safe environment where 
people feel safe to express their concerns. But again we 
are human and there are times where, depending on 
the stakes involved and the conversation, sometimes 
there is some hesitancy. (Manager, Site 1)
Everybody pretty much keeps to themselves, or if they 
feel a certain way about something they will share it 
with another co-worker and they’ll bicker, but the 
problem is not going to be addressed because it’s just 
gossip. Not getting to the core that can actually do 
something about it. (Clerk, Site 1)
Some reasons given for the obscuring of such 
concerns echoed the existing literature on speaking 
up: the personal effort and risk associated with raising 
issues, lack of feedback and a sense of futility. As they 
are widely reported in the literature,22–26 we do not 
repeat them here. Instead, we focus on the paradoxi-
cally silencing effect of formal systems.
the logic of formal systems
As well as reporting their enthusiasm for voice, many 
senior leaders described an instinct towards formalisa-
tion. To make a concern knowable at the blunt end27 
(senior/executive level) meant converting it into a form 
recognisable as legitimate evidence. Soft intelligence 
needed to be made ‘hard’: properly documented, 
formalised and amenable to verification. For leaders, 
the simplest way of achieving this was to encourage 
people to use one of the existing systems, rendering 
the concern as something that could reasonably be 
known and in a recognisable form.
[If] one of the receptionists comes up and says, ‘This 
thing happened with this person and that wasn’t right 
and I’m afraid it’s going to happen again’—the pretty 
much universal response for that now is, ‘Yes, that 
is a concern; fill out [an incident report].’ (Medical 
director, Site 1)
Regardless of the form or shape in which a concern 
surfaced, formal channels were geared towards a goal 
of establishing facts through defined procedures. In 
their accounts of establishing ‘the facts’ of a given 
situation, leaders emphasised respect for due process 
and quality of evidence. They explained how inves-
tigating concerns could involve a painstaking process 
of disambiguation, involving much effort and regard 
for fairness. For example, the need to understand the 
different ‘sides’ of a story was frequently invoked.
I usually interview all the staff, I collect all the 
information and I tell the manager I’m going to do this 
to understand what the issues are. Because I know it’s 
always two-sided: I want to hear what the manager’s 
perspective is about the issue but I want to hear each 
individual staff member. (Senior leader, Site 1)
I would ask her to document her recollection of the 
events. If she doesn’t feel comfortable I would tell her 
that I was going to take some notes. I would take some 
notes, get her feedback, say to her, ‘Is this what you’re 
telling me?’ Paraphrasing what she’d said, and make 
sure she agrees with what I’ve documented. Then I’d 
get the staff member in and say, ‘Can you tell me about 
this incident that happened with this patient on this 
day?’ Get his take on it. (Director of nursing, Site 2)
Also important was an interest in defensibility. Leaders 
sought to minimise exposure to risks of litigation, 
complaints of bullying or discrimination, or union action.
You have to meet with the staff, and they have a 
representative, and you do, and then it’s ‘He said’, 
‘She said’, right? Because unless I’m there standing 
watching it, unless someone’s sent me an e-mail with 
all of the information, or documented it, I’m stuck 
because at the end of the day they’re going to deny it. 
(Senior nurse, Site 3)
Often there is a counterclaim of bullying/harassment 
made, that is a vexatious claim made by someone 
because they don’t like how the person operates. So 
there is a lot of this nonsense that goes on. (Manager, 
Site 2)
Attention to due process satisfied administrative and 
legal requirements for fairness, meticulousness of proce-
dure and the ability to justify decisions and actions. But 
it also had perverse effects. These included, most notably, 
the potential to stifle sharing of information and suppress 
soft intelligence, turning it into a form of ‘forbidden 
knowledge’28 that was dangerous to know or reveal.
the keeping of secrets
In interviews, it became clear that some concerns were 
never voiced, notwithstanding the plethora of avail-
able mechanisms.
I think [staff are] fairly comfortable on [raising] 
factual things, like the medication came up with the 
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wrong dose. Completely uncomfortable on personal-
behaviour stuff. That would never, never, [arise] on 
a safety round, I can tell you that. (Professor, Site 1)
In part, this reluctance was due to generalised concern 
and uncertainty about the potential consequences 
of such an act, especially when it meant indicting a 
colleague. Participants were much happier to use 
formal channels to report concerns about systems or 
equipment failures, where individual competence or 
behaviour was not implicated.20 Central to reluctance 
to speak up about concerns about individuals was the 
widely shared understanding that to raise a concern 
formally was to allow it to pass from one world (that 
of the sharp end) to another (the blunt end, with its 
processes and procedures). In that other, blunt-end 
world, incipient concerns would be processed through 
a set of bureaucratic controls aimed at making them 
hard: evidenced, formal, tractable to organisational 
intervention. Inchoate intuitions or suspicions would 
be expected to demonstrate some degree of orderli-
ness; conflicts over the proper definition of particular 
situations would be adjudicated.
There’s a lot of weight that goes into that, and what 
if my assumption was wrong? […] I would go to 
someone first, would talk it through first. (Nurse, Site 
3)
And you just feel like you’re taking this piece that feels 
like a more visceral experience, and trying to parse it 
into these artificial structures that have no emotional 
weight for you. (Attending physician, Site 3)
Unsurprisingly, participants’ doubts about giving 
voice often related to their confidence that they could 
demonstrate the validity of their concerns. When they 
were unsure that the concerns could survive harsh 
scrutiny, they were likely to maintain silence. For 
one thing, they did not want to become drawn into 
a wearying cataloguing of evidentiary artefacts that 
would legitimise their claims.
The next step for me was to start documenting specific 
behaviours, and have like ‘On 8 December this person 
did this at 10 o’clock,’ so I would have evidence of 
what was happening. (Allied health professional, Site 
2)
Further, to voice a concern that passed into the world 
of the blunt end was not only to allow it to be formal-
ised, but also to have a share in the consequences. Partic-
ipants sometimes saw the formal procedures followed 
to establish the ‘facts of the matter’ as risking an esca-
lation of hostilities that would ultimately undermine 
other, more important goals—for example, preserving 
good working relationships—or that would erupt into 
an outcome disproportionate to the circumstances.
Depending on what the circumstance is—I don’t want 
to be responsible, potentially, for someone getting 
fired or something catastrophic to happen. (Registered 
nurse, Site 1)
Anxiety about evidence and process was particularly 
relevant when the intelligence was especially soft—feel-
ings or intuitions that were difficult to resolve into a 
coherent, compelling reconstruction of an incident.
If I’m not perfectly sure of my standing on a certain 
issue, I have to do some real homework to really 
feel like I’m in charge and then I can feel more 
comfortable. But I might feel uncomfortable if I don’t 
know all the facts or if I don’t know the heart of the 
story. (Administrator, Site 1)
Formal systems in the sites were geared towards 
resolution—by rectifying a system problem, improving 
a clinical process or addressing a behavioural issue—
or, conversely, exonerating an individual or team of 
culpability. Senior leaders’ descriptions of how they 
would respond to a formally raised concern typi-
cally included a plan of action designed to tackle the 
problem as an endpoint. Sometimes this was appro-
priate. But for these more ambiguous problems, this 
orientation towards resolution could deter those with 
concerns from broaching them formally, because—in 
their view—the issue was simply too ambiguous, too 
complex, too unformed to be amenable to resolu-
tion. Participants recognised the limitations of even 
the most thorough of investigations, and therefore 
worried that any intervention might be premature, 
disproportionate or misdirected.
Have I ever [raised concerns formally]? No, I guess 
not really. […] I mean for all I know maybe they were 
so short-staffed that person could, maybe the order 
never got to this person to draw [a blood]. (Physician, 
Site 3)
I think that it judges the person who we are putting in, 
or who we are mentioning, unnecessarily […] rather 
than we just want to raise and it needs to be looked 
into. (Physician, Site 2)
Informal validation of concerns
Participants described informal sense-checking, fact-
finding and behaviour-monitoring as a routine part 
of work at the sharp end. It formed a functional part 
of the day-to-day regulation of behaviour, particu-
larly among clinical peers, allowing concerns to be 
addressed in situ without engaging formal systems. But 
participants also noted its downsides. In particular, 
once a norm of dealing with problems locally became 
dominant, it could lead to implicit tolerance for behav-
iours that were unacceptable.
I will voice my issues with friends, like if I go to lunch 
or something, as long as it is not something that is 
confidential. I have a confidante here that I will throw 
things back and forth at. […] I will get other people’s 
opinions on how to handle things. I never have an 
issue with that. I think the more the merrier when 
you are trying to fix something that really needs to be 
fixed. (Supervisor, Site 1)
There was a lot of talk about [competence issue] 
before anything was ever done to address it with her, 
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in a formal way at least. People pointed out her errors 
along way, in terms of what she should have done to be 
more prepared, how she needed to be more thorough. 
But I do think there was a certain amount of hesitancy 
to do anything formal about it, because of knowing 
that’s someone’s career. (Attending physician, Site 3)
Where individuals felt that intervention was 
needed, one strategy was to engage informal valida-
tion processes that had some symmetries with formal 
approaches to establishing facts. Participants described 
corroborating their story with others and gaining allies. 
In these situations, they built up portfolios of evidence 
and sought safety in numbers through collective voice.
A co-resident and I were sent off to the gastroenterology 
clinic for an afternoon, and we were both pretty 
sure that the attending was drunk. We noticed it 
independently, that he smelt like alcohol. And we 
spent like three days talking to each other about what 
should we do. We really didn’t know what we should 
do. And ultimately we went to talk to our programme 
director. (Primary care physician, Site 3)
Accessing soft intelligence
Some managerial participants described specific proac-
tive strategies for supplementing formal systems with 
other sources of knowledge. These strategies had two 
defining characteristics. First, they sought to separate 
gathering intelligence from acting on intelligence. 
What seemed important was creating opportunities 
for voice without simultaneously imposing the expec-
tation that a formal process would necessarily follow.
It might be one colleague coming to me and saying, 
‘Did you know so-and-so, this is happening with this 
individual.’ So there are lot of ways, I don’t want to 
call them informants, but there are a lot of ways that 
the staff feel comfortable bringing things to us. (Senior 
leader, Site 1)
Second, these strategies were explicitly relational: 
they involved leaders being visible and available, 
and seeking to create trusting relationships where 
colleagues could feel confident about raising sensitive 
or embryonic concerns. When leaders—at all levels, 
but particularly in senior clinical roles—took steps to 
meet sharp-end colleagues and make personal connec-
tions, they were more likely to hear concerns.
We have this thing called coffee with nurses. […] So 
when it is a sit-down talk about patient safety, it seems 
like those things kind of get stilted. Whereas what in 
my opinion has made conversations about difficult 
issues easier has been now that I have been here long 
enough. And having those interactions, […] when 
the time comes to have a difficult conversation, then 
they can take place without being under the spotlight. 
(Physician, Site 1)
Skilful, supportive middle managers were identi-
fied as having an important role in encouraging staff 
to voice concerns: opportunities for discreet conver-
sations about sensitive issues were especially valued. 
Central to perceived success was shedding the trap-
pings of formal processes to create environments 
where people felt comfortable in raising concerns, and 
confident that they would be dealt with proportion-
ately and appropriately.
She is not saying, ‘Well that is completely stupid,’ 
or ‘Have you lost your mind?’ or anything like that. 
She says, ‘Let’s look at this objectively,’ and then if it 
turns into something that needs to go to a different 
department or further up the command structure, 
she is the one that takes it up there and she says, ‘My 
people have identified this as an issue.’ (Administrator,  
Site 1)
dIscussIon
This study, involving a large number of interviews with 
organisational participants at multiple levels across 
three sites, suggests that some potentially relevant 
intelligence may never reach managerial level, and is 
not detectable through formally constituted systems 
for raising concerns. Instead, it remains fugitive, part of 
a hidden world of confidences and half-secrets. Formal 
systems may, ironically, sometimes contribute to the 
subduing of voice, perhaps especially when it relates 
to concerns about colleagues’ competence, attitudes or 
behaviour. Participants at all levels were sensitive to 
the logic of action that follows from formalisation of 
concerns: once concerns pass from sharp to blunt end, 
they are in the domain of the system, where certain 
bureaucratically ordained processes must follow, and 
where downstream consequences are unpredictable. 
This results in material and emotional burden for 
those who voice concerns: they must evidence their 
concerns according to the formal criteria required by 
the blunt end, and they also become implicated in the 
consequences of voice for all parties, which are not 
predictable and may be profound.
The bureaucratic form taken by formal channels 
exists not because those at the blunt end are insensitive 
to the complexities of clinical and emotional realities. 
Rather, it is because of the demands of legal and regu-
latory frameworks, institutional norms and organisa-
tional policy. But the urge for certainty and resolution 
does not sit comfortably with many of the concerns that 
reside at the sharp end. Here, people worry that efforts 
to clarify might be premature, and result in inappro-
priate or even counterproductive outcomes. The risk, 
then, is that attempting to find the ‘facts of the matter’ 
through proceduralised processes—turning the soft into 
hard—might actually result in information losses rather 
than gains. The result is that potentially valuable infor-
mation about risks to patient safety becomes a form of 
‘forbidden knowledge’,28 suppressed through social and 
cultural pressures. For those who see in employee voice 
a route to organisational vigilance and early intervention 
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to prevent harm,2 5 29 this insight poses important 
challenges.
The emphasis in managerial accounts on due 
process, procedure and establishing facts that we have 
found is not, of course, unique to healthcare. It is 
consistent with a long-term, widespread trend towards 
legalism—where legal considerations and a concern 
for defensibility play an increasingly central role in 
organisational life.30 A key consequence of legalism 
is that, as Michael Power notes, ‘organizations must 
make themselves auditable and present their opera-
tions in specific ways which are aligned with legalized 
culture.’31 The move towards legalism has many posi-
tive effects, including respect for due process, consid-
erations of equity and fairness and discouragement 
of vexatious complaints. But it is not wholly benign. 
Building on previous work,5 we suggest that a preoc-
cupation with formal systems may lead to neglect of 
other expressions of concern, including the wealth of 
informal, interpersonal ways individuals identify and 
manage problems every day.20 32
This leads us to the question of how to harvest 
soft intelligence of the kind that might be valuable to 
leaders. The solutions are unlikely to lie in designing 
ever more elaborate systems for reporting concerns: 
as Sitkin and Roth argue,33 additional formal mecha-
nisms may simply lead to an ‘arms race’ of systems that 
do little to address the underlying problem and that 
further erode trust:
The adoption of legalistic ‘remedies’ (ie, 
institutionalized mechanisms that mimic legal forms 
and exceed legal/regulatory requirements) imposes a 
psychological and/or an interactional barrier between 
the two parties that stimulates an escalating spiral of 
formality and distance and leads to a need for more 
rules.
Our findings similarly suggest that the nature of 
formal processes and the bureaucratic systems in 
which they are ensnared means that no amount of 
effort to improve such processes, for example, by 
making them more accessible, exhorting individuals 
to report concerns or emphasising that they exist for 
learning rather than blame, will fully overcome this 
challenge. This is not, of course, to suggest that there 
is no place for such systems: they are vital. Nor is it to 
suggest that these systems cannot be improved. But for 
certain kinds of problems, some of which may be crit-
ical to foresight and prevention of harm, they may not 
provide a full solution. With this in mind, we offer two 
possible routes to restoring the connection between 
blunt end and sharp end and permitting the sharing of 
inchoate yet potentially critical insights.
One is that informal, peer-oriented use of voice in 
response to concerning practice and behaviour may be 
an effective, low-cost way of handling possible breaches 
of standards of good practice or conduct.34 Leaders 
might usefully recognise that not all voice behaviours 
need result in formalisation or action; it may be 
more helpful to support local problem-solving, while 
ensuring that an escalation plan is available should this 
fail, and that problems are not tolerated for too long. 
A particular risk here is that leaders immersed local 
cultures might fail to recognise the problems associ-
ated with entrenched behaviours; any such approach 
will need to be accompanied by clear statements of 
appropriate standards of conduct. Such an approach 
is also likely to require new skills (including those 
relating to listening and counselling) and new norms 
(including curbing the urge to intervene formally).
A second solution is relational in character. There 
were hints in our data that leaders who were visible, 
trustworthy and provided informal opportunities 
to listen may have some success in improving voice 
behaviour. Crucially, this meant abandoning the quest 
for clarity and certainty, and accepting the ambiguity 
inherent in such signals, avoiding a rush to action that 
may be inappropriate, premature or have unintended 
consequences. The extent to which senior leaders are 
able to devote time to such activities in resource-con-
strained healthcare organisations will vary; it is also 
important that opportunities for informal discussions 
are governed by trust and confidence, rather than 
being seen as an exercise in accountability.35
Our study has limitations. It is based on interviews 
only, and we had no means of verifying behaviours, 
practices or impacts. While we did all we could to 
emphasise confidentiality and make participation 
as safe as possible, we cannot say whether this was 
successful in securing participation of a breadth of 
informants, or in obtaining complete accounts from 
interviewees. Finally, while the number of participants 
was large for a qualitative study, data collection was 
limited to three institutions (each with a strong focus 
on improving its safety culture) in two high-income 
countries; this may limit its transferability beyond such 
settings, though it is plausible that the challenges we 
found would be at least as acute in institutions less 
intent on improving voice. All three organisations 
were also large, academic medical centres; in other 
organisations (including smaller acute hospitals, and 
also other healthcare settings where the gap between 
blunt end and sharp end is less pronounced, where 
staff are fewer in number, and where interpersonal and 
interprofessional relationships may be rather different) 
our findings may have been quite different.
conclusIon
Our study suggests that on occasion, efforts to glean 
insights from the sharp end about risks to quality 
and safety may be thwarted by the very mechanisms 
intended to facilitate communication. The nature of 
concerns about quality and safety means that they 
are often partial, incomplete and ill formed. Systems 
that demand clarity and certainty, whether because of 
well-meaning regard for due process and evidential 
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foundation or the dominance of legalistic processes in 
organisations, may deter those at the sharp end from 
voicing such concerns. If organisations value these 
insights as a means of sensing problems proactively, 
they may require other approaches to accessing them 
that are less pervaded by formality and the search for 
certainty.
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